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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Organizing is talking, but what we say reflects
our place in an organization. Workers at the lowest
level (operations) talk mainly about technical and
other processes that produce products and services for clients and customers. They also spend
some of their time talking to supervisors to ensure
the efficiency and effectiveness of those processes.
In addition to the operational staff, supervisors
talk to other supervisors about their technical
processes as well as the policies and guidelines for
those processes that were approved by senior
managers. Those senior managers talk extensively
with people inside and outside the organization
about trends, regulations, and issues that shape
the strategy and policies they create to take the
firm forward. In turn, policies and strategies shape
the processes used by supervisors and operational
staff to make the organization successful and
profitable.
What senior managers say is most consequential to
organizations. They have the position and power to
talk loudest, and their words are heard and appraised
by the widest spectrum of people inside and outside
the organization. But while we tend to examine the
artifacts resulting from such talk, less is known about
the internal power dynamics that shape and direct
their discourse. That is the essence of a study by
Penny Dick (University of Sheffield) and David
Collings (Dublin City University). They propose that
while senior managers have the authority to create
and communicate organizational strategy, it may
come at a cost. Specifically, Dick and Collings contend that the act of talking about strategy invites resistance, and exposes senior managers to setbacks
and perceptions of weakness. In their study, Dick
and Collings sought to examine how senior managers

attempt to minimize such disruptions when they talk
about strategy.
Indeed, Dick and Collings discuss the shift from the
notion of strategy as a linear and objective organizational product to a “linguistic construction” that is
contextualized within the social and historical experiences of the firm and its employees. As a consequence, strategy discourse is not what the organization
“does or is,” but reflects “specific categories of action
and experience that act, recursively, to shape action
and experience” (p. 1515). And so, terminologies that
are often invoked when managers engage in strategy
discourse are not fixed, but variable according the
rhetorical situations that inform and constrain them
(Bitzer, 1968). Those situations may be fraught with
uncertainty and ambiguity, thereby allowing supervisors, operational employees, and external players to
resist strategy initiatives and to challenge the arguments upon which the strategy is predicated.

STUDY DESIGN AND METHOD
To better understand the complex role of power
among various participants to destabilize, resist,
contest, and control strategy discourse inside the
firm, Dick and Collings examined data using the
framework of “discursive psychology,” which asserts that the substance of talk among the participants is not merely what the participants think, but
more about what the conditions and constraints require them to share. Discursive psychologists chart
the interaction among participants to determine the
roles and turns taken, the shifting relations among
them, and the use of the local or internal conditions
to support their positions. The framework is best
used in analysis of in situ discourse, as opposed to
relying on the relics or recollections of participants.
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Data was sourced from a larger project consisting
of 17 interviews with senior managers as well as
some middle managers and operational employees.
The goal of that project was to determine how human
resource management practices emanating from
a multinational American firm were adapted at its
Ireland-based subsidiary where the interviews were
held. Subjects were selected for their deep knowledge of human resources and were interviewed for
an average of an hour. For this study, Dick and Collings chose an interview with the vice president of
operations because of the clarity of details about how
the vice president constructed and used strategy
discourse. The data analyzed consisted of two extracts of the interview with the vice president lasting
about two minutes and 458 words—about one-tenth
of the word count of the full interview.
KEY FINDINGS
In the first extract, which came from very early in
the interview, the vice president is asked to assess
the firm’s strategy in the last 18 months since his
arrival at the company. His response construes the
strategy as independent of its agents and execution,
and the execution as a straightforward project. The
vice president relies on standard, established discourse about strategy, yet seems to diminish the active role of senior managers in the development and
discussion of that strategy. Dick and Collings conclude that the interview presents strategy in a passive way.
In the second extract, the discussion shifts to how
the subsidiary is judged by the parent company using
a scorecard of financial and operational metrics. The
vice president seems to suggest that the scorecard
can be used to detect problems, but that the success
of the subsidiary is a reflection of the active efforts of
the subsidiary’s senior managers. His implication of
such agency is more pronounced by the fact that the
senior management team had replaced a previous
team 18 months before. Put simply, in this extract the
vice president seems to shift the discourse from the
first extract where he presents strategy as a routine
business model. In the second extract he makes
a greater claim of agency and the role of the actions of
the senior management team.
From their analysis of the interview extracts, Dick
and Collings concluded that there can be tension in
the representation of strategy by senior managers—
between strategy as an objective standard based on
facts that are independent of the actors (“you are not
asked as senior management to strategize about the
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future,” Extract 1, p. 1522), and strategy as acted on
and the province of executives (“To take something
and blueprint it the whole way. . .without due recognition of local management and to think it can be
equally implemented in each area is a fallacy.” Extract 2, p. 1526).
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The goal of this study was to evaluate the shifts and
dynamics in the representation of strategy discourse,
especially how those shifts undermine and contradict each other. Furthermore, such shifts can be
exploited by resistance and disruptions, even an interviewer’s incredulity. The context of this strategy
discourse is particularly relevant as the vice president seeks to justify the localized action of his management cohorts, and not merely the presence of
a strategy dictated from the parent company a continent away. The vice president’s shift to more local
accountability could be justified.
While it is difficult to determine the robustness of
the results in this study due to the thin slice data
chosen from the interview and the highly idiosyncratic style of analysis, Dick and Collings give some
insight into the importance of analyzing the power
dynamics of management discourse as it relates to
business strategy. After all, strategy discourse has the
most far-reaching impact on the life and success
of the company. They believe that nonverbal indications such as tone of voice, gestures, eye contact,
physical stance, and use of space can provide richer
insights into the discursive practices of how managers talk about strategy. Dick and Collings demonstrate that even senior managers, while appearing to
dominate strategy talk, can be as vulnerable as they
respond to questions and challenges to the flow they
attempt to sustain in their narrative.
The findings of the study continue and confirm
aspects of the broader discussion of managerial discourse and its outcomes. For example, Kornberger
and Clegg (2011) described strategizing as an aesthetic performance and sociopolitical practice deriving power from the interplay of facts and values. A
decade before, Jameson (2001) wrote that managers
use narrative to resolve conflicts and reduce situational and factual complexities, but that narrative
can also damage trust between managers and their
audiences because of the beliefs and values embedded in the discourse. More recently, Dulek and
Campbell (2015) explored the “darker side” of strategic communication, where managers use deceptive and ambiguous rhetoric to (mis)represent
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their discourse and overcome potential disruptions.
In this study, while the level of resistance seems relatively slight, it is nevertheless discernible. Consequently, this appearance of vulnerability warrants
further research and attention by management scholars.
For business practitioners, the study provides
abundant insight into the nature of managerial discourse, and how such discourse is (or, can be) modified to meet the constraints of the circumstances.
Senior managers must be aware that talking about
strategy is not a static or predictable course, but that
discourse must be constructed in ways that respond to
different stakeholders using an array of rhetorical and
conversational devices. In his book, What the CEO
Wants You to Know, Charan (2001) stated that effective communication begins with dialog and that the
best top managers find ways to distill the complexity
to make it accessible to employees. On the other hand,
“it’s easier for frontline employees to object to management decisions. . .when everyone can use the same
language to communicate” (Heath & Heath, 2007).
Such is the danger, dilemma, and/or delight of talking
about strategy.
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